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T H E NUCLEAR TEST-BAN
TREATY:
GATEWAY TO PEACE
Since the beginning of history, the life of man
has been shadowed by the fear of war. Since the
end of the Second World War, man's fear of war
has been immeasurably heightened by the invention of nuclear weapons. The elimination of war
has long been man's hope; now it is his urgent
necessity if he is to survive on this planet. Nothing
has preoccupied humanity more in the years since
1945 than the effort to abolish war and, as part of
that effort, to bring about universal disarmament.
Yet nothing has frustrated men of goodwill more
than the failure of the great nations to agree on
how they might safely disarm. Many things have
contributed to that failure : the historic legacy of

suspicion among nation-states ;the inherent tension
between closed and open societies; the technical
difficulties of devising mechanisms of inspection and
control; the political difficulties of accepting mechanisms of enforcement; even perhaps the vested
interests which some dogmas and institutions may
have in the perpetuation of crisis. All these things
account for the terrifying gap between humanity's
hope and man's achievement in the conquest of
war.
From the day in June 1946 when Bernard
Baruch, on behalf of the United States, offered to
surrender the American monopoly of atomic weapons to a United Nations authority empowered to
control all atomic activities, men have submitted
a variety of plans to limit and to eliminate the
weapons by which nations might destroy each
other. Some of these plans have been serious;
others have been mere polemics or propaganda.
And yet in these 16 years under the shadow of the
mushroom cloud, almost no progress has been
achieved toward serious control. The single exception-the one ray of light in a dark decade of
stalemate-has been the test-ban talks in Geneva.

The Test-Ban Treaty

The Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests began on October 3 1, 1958.
The participants have been the United States, the
United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union. For over
330 sessions, representatives of these three nations
have sat around the conference table in earnest
discussion of intricate scientific and political questions. The forbidding technicality of the talks has
not concealed the terrible gravity of the issues at
stake. And the overhanging sense of gravity produced for a time in 1958-60 a season of genuine
negotiation. There was give and take. Areas
of disagreement narrowed. In 2% years the conference succeeded in adopting a preamble, 17
articles, and 2 annexes of a draft treaty. While
important issues remained, it seemed at last as if
the great powers could agree on at least one concrete program as a prelude to a broader attack on
the institution of war.
When President Kennedy took office in January
1961, he called for an immediate and intensive
review of United States policy in order to overcome the remaining obstacles and bring the conference to a successful conclusion. Ambassador

Arthur Dean, resuming the Geneva discussions in
March, came with a new set of proposals designed
to meet all legitimate Soviet reservations. Then,
in a painstaking process, the United States and the
United Kingdom combined all the new proposals
plus every agreement previously reached in a complete nuclear test-ban treaty. That treaty was
put on the table at Geneva on April 18, 1961.
This historic document promises to end the fear
of nuclear tests and radioactive fallout through a
pledge by all signatory nations not to test nuclear
weapons-a pledge to be made meaningful by international inspection. How would this be done?
The treaty proposes to ban under adequate safeguards :
1. All tests in the earth's atmosphere-the main
source of radioactive fallout.
2. All tests in outer space.
3. All tests in the oceans.
4. All tests underground, except those producing signals of less than 4.75 seismic magnitude.
The treaty omits underground tests below the
4.75 threshold pending improvement in detection
methods through a seismic research program. In
the interim, while research is carried out on detec-

tion methods, there would be a 3-year moratorium
on such tests. The ultimate objective is a treaty
which would ban all tests under appropriate
guarantees.
After signature by the United States, the United
Kingdom, and the Soviet Union, the treaty would
be open to other nations of the world, small and
large. The treaty would be policed by a
worldwide detection system operated by a single
administrator and an international staff. The
administrator and his staff would be under the
policy direction of a Control Commission, composed of four representatives from the Soviet side,
four from the Anglo-American side, and three neutrals. The headquarters would be in Vienna.
The staff would operate 180 fixed control posts on
land and on ships at sea, equipped with instruments for detecting illegal tests by their sound,
light, radio waves, nuclear radiations, radioactive
debris, or earthshock. The control posts would be
supplemented in doubtful cases by inspectioncarried out by international teams of experts-at
the site of a possible violation. To remove any
fear that inspectors would ''rove" beyond their irnmediate assignment, the treaty would lay down

strict safeguards: inspection teams would be accompanied by observers from the host country,
would travel along routes prescribed by the host
country, and would inspect only a restricted area
predetermined by the seismic data.
By itself, the treaty banning nuclear weapons
testing is, of course, a limited measure. But, as a
first step in the world's assault on the institution of
war, it could be a measure of incalculable importance. The treaty would bring about a number of
tangible gains for humanity. It would slow down
the arms race. It would eliminate the risk of biological and genetic damage from radioactive strontium and the other poisonous materials cast off by
nuclear explosions in the atmosphere. It would
check the multiplication of new types of nuclear
weapons and discourage the spread of nuclear
weapons to additional nations, thereby reducing
the hazard of accidental war.
Above all, it would mark a great adventure in
international collaboration for peace. The testban treaty contains most of the issues of trust and
verification found in the wider and more difficult
field of general disarmament. Out of the experience with the test-ban treaty could come the

mutual confidence, the tested procedures, and the
concerted policies which would enable the world
to mount a wider and deeper attack on war itself.
If the great nations can set up a collective system
which effectively abolishes nuclear tests, surely they
can hope to set up a collective system which effectively abolishes all the diverse and manifold weapons of human self -destruction.
In the long frustrations of the disarmament
fight, the test-ban treaty was the world's first hope
of progress. It is this hope which the Soviet
Union, through an abrupt and inexplicable reversal of its own position, now threatens to dash from
our lips.
The Soviet Alternative

Ambassador Semyon Tsarapkin, the chief of the
Soviet delegation at Geneva, said this year,
"Agreement could speedily be reached on all outstanding questions on the basis of the proposals
submitted by the Soviet Union." What sort of a
system of control would result if agreement were
to be reached on this basis? Under the AngloAmerican treaty, an earthshock, if unidentified,
could set in motion an immediate process of

inspection and verification. What would happen
under the Soviet system if an unidentified earthshock took place within the borders of the Soviet
Union?
Under the Soviet system, such an unidentified
event would not even be inspected in the first 4
years after the treaty came into force.
If the event occurred after the inspection system was operating, there is no assurance that it
would be reported properly to the control headquarters. The chief of the control post would be
a Soviet citizen, and it cannot be assumed that
any man would inspect his own country with ruthless impartiality. Soviet proposals require, moreover, that one third of the technical staff of control
posts be persons recommended by the Soviet Government and that no member of the staff can be
appointed without Soviet consent. A staff composed of persons acceptable to the host country
would obviously have ample chance for malpractice in reading, analyzing, or reporting the results
of instrumentation.
If an event in the Soviet Union were reported
to the control headquarters, a decision on its eligibility for inspection would have to be made.

Unless it were possible to locate the event with
complete certainty within an area of 75 square
miles, it would not be eligible for inspection under
the quota according to the Soviet proposal.
Since the Soviet view is that to be thus eligible an
event must be, in addition, in Chairman Khrushchev's words, "suspected of being an atomic explosion," the Soviet representative, through an
individual interpretation of the seismic data, might
even reject an inspection of an event by asserting
that it was not suspicious.
If the event were actually certified for inspection, the United States and the United Kingdom would have to decide whether to use one of
the three annual inspections permitted by the
Soviet Union. All three inspections could not be
used in the early months of a year, because the
rest of the year would then be a complete holiday
from inspection. This would mean that up to the
last weeks only two inspections a year would be
effectively available to check on the 100 or more
unidentified seismic events above 4.75 seismic magnitude each year in the whole of the Soviet Union.
If an inspection team set out to look at the site,
the control organization would have to work out

inspection procedures. Up to this point, the Soviet Union has resisted efforts to set forth such
procedures. It now advocates the replacement
of the single impartial administrator envisaged in
the treaty by a tripartite administrative boardthe so-called "troika." While the "troika" could
not veto a formal decision to inspect-a decision
made by either the United States, the United
Kingdom, or the Soviet Union-it could effectively
veto the practical arrangements for inspection.
Therefore if an unidentified event in the Soviet
Union did pass the Soviet obstacle course and was
actually recorded; was read, analyzed, and reported to the control organization; met the arbitrary criteria imposed by the Soviet Union; and
was within the quota of three insisted on by the
Soviet Union-if all this were done, the Soviet
representative could still obstruct the control process by refusing to agree to adequate or efficient
procedures for on-site inspection. Moreover, with
Soviet insistence that inspection on its territory be
carried out under the leadership of a Soviet citizen
whose technical staff must be 50 percent Soviet,
the reliability of the inspection operation would
always be doubtful.

Under the Soviet proposal, in short, no staff
would be hired, no control posts established, no
instruments set up, no interpretation of seismic data
made, and thus in effect no on-site inspections
undertaken without the consent of the Soviet r e p
resentative on the "troika" At almost every stage
in the process, there would be abundant opportunity to thwart and block the mechanism of control.
The whole purpose of the test-ban treaty is to
deter clandestine tests. What deterrence would
this Soviet system offer? If the Soviet Union is
planning no violations, why does it insist on sham
control?
.I
Background for Geneva

The problem of fallout came sharply to the
world's attention in 1954, when both the United
States and the Soviet Union tested large-yield nuclear weapons in the atmosphere with marked
radioactive aftereffects. In the next years, as scientists analyzed the long-term effects of radioactive
contamination on the bones, the blood, and the
germ plasm of man, concern over the continuation
of nuclear testing grew everywhere in the world.
In 1954 Prime Minister Nehru called for a "stand-

still agreement" on nuclear testing. In 1955 the
Soviet Union proposed "an agreement on the cessation of experiments with all types of nuclear weapons." In the next years, Soviet officials assailed
those who wish to associate test suspension with
broader disarmament measures for "artificially
linking" unrelated issues. As concern spread on
every side, Prime Minister Nehru in November
1957 appealed to "the great leaders, more especially
of America and Russia,
to stop all nuclear
test explosions and thus to show to the world that
they are determined to end this menace, and to
proceed also to bring about effective disarmament."
Early in 1958 President Eisenhower suggested to
Marshal Bulganin, then the Soviet Prime Minister,
that technical groups take up various aspects of
disarmament, including the control of a test ban. A
series of exchanges between the two Governments
led to a Conference of Experts from eight countries
at Geneva in July and August 1958. After deliberation, they concluded that a control system to
detect violation of a test ban was technically feasible. In late August the United States Government,
welcoming the experts' report, proposed negotiation among the nuclear powers looking toward the

...

suspension of tests and the establishment of the
control system. At the same time the United States
Government said that, unless the Soviet Union resumed testing, it would stop further testing for 1
year from the beginning of the negotiations.
In October 1958 the United States completed
its last series of nuclear tests. The Conference on
the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests
opened in Geneva on October 3 1. On November 1
and 3 the Soviet Union exploded nuclear devices.
The United States nevertheless declared that it
would continue its test suspension unless the Soviet
Union conducted further tests.
Purposes of the Conference

The essential problem at the Geneva conference
was the establishment of a system of control reliable
enough to span the abyss of suspicions between the
Western democracies and the Soviet Union. The
need for building trust through verifiable safeguards is, of course, basic to the survival of nations.
Wherever a nation gives up any part of its military
strength, it must act with utmost care, for the lives
of its people are at stake. With regard to nuclear
testing, the specific danger is that of clandestine

testing-testing which evades the instruments of
detection. Obviously, if two nations promise to
stop testing and one tests secretly while the other
remains faithful to the covenant, the cheating
nation reaps military advantages which, in time,
may become decisive.
The United States delegation laid down three
requirements for effective control :
1. The system of control must be capable of
detecting nuclear explosions prohibited by
the treaty.
2. All events which cannot be identified as natural by the system must be eligible for inspection even though all unidentified events
will not in fact be inspected.
3. The number of inspections must be related
to the number of unidentified events. The
inspection bridge, in other words, must vary
in length between events detected and events
identified.
For its part, the Soviet Union lost few opportunities to profess its desire for a test ban. Thus in
January 1959 the Soviet Government declared that
it had "been persistently pressing for a cessation of
atomic and hydrogen weapon tests as a first and

highly important step towards a radical solution of
the disarmament problem."
Two and a half years of patient negotiation
produced progress. In 1961, when President
Kennedy ordered the review of the U.S. position,
prospects for agreement on the first arms control
measure of the nuclear age seemed favorable.
The world watched the reunion of the delegates at
Geneva in March 1961 with high expectation.
Then at the first session of the resumed conference
the Soviet representative suddenly repudiated an
already agreed portion of the treaty and reversed a
good deal of the progress of 2% years.
In order to understand what happened at Geneva, it is necessary to take a hard look at the
points of disagreement. Even before the 1961
meetings, these fell in two groups: the technical
issues involved in detecting tests underground, and
the political issues involved in inspection and
control.
Underground Testing

The detectability of nuclear explosions depends
essentially on how large they are and where they
are held. Nuclear tests in the earth's atmos-

phere-and it is these tests which produce nearly
all the radioactive fallout-are relatively easy to
identify. Even without a complete treaty control
system, it is possible to identify atmospheric fallout tests in the 5-kiloton range with high reliability. Tests in the ocean present harder but by
no means insoluble problems. Tests in outer space
are more tricky, but within limits the signals they
generate can be recorded by a variety of instruments located on the earth or in satellites.
For all these tests, various detection methods are
available, including sound, light, radiowaves, radiation, and radioactive debris. Tests underground
provide a far more difficult challenge. Here the
earth swallows up signals which might otherwise
be detectable. Only one method is now known:
the measurement of the seismic waves transmitted
through the earth as a result of the earthshock.
And seismic measurement is complicated by the
fact that the thousands of earthquakes occurring
naturally every year often give off signals very similar to those of manrnade underground explosions.
In the summer of 1958, the Conference of Experts evaluated the art of underground detection
on the evidence from the single underground test

that had then been conducted. But more detailed
evidence, emerging from the series of underground
American nuclear tests in the fall of 1958, showed
that the Geneva group had underestimated the difficulties of detecting underground events. In
March 1959 a panel of American scientists, headed
by Dr. Lloyd V. Berkner, recommended research
programs to improve seismic detection and thus
restore the capability originally claimed for the
detection system. The Berkner report also warned
that new methods could reduce the detectability of
underground explosions, especially "decoupling"that is, conducting explosions in large underground
cavities where the seismic signals would be muffled. A nuclear detonation of about 20 kilotons
in Nevada tuff would give off seismic signals in
the 4.75 range; if the same detonation took place
in a vast cavity in hard rock, seismic signals might
be reduced by as much as a factor of 300.
The new evidence confronted the conference
with the fact that, given the state of the art, an
agreement banning all nuclear tests under reliable
safeguards was simply not feasible. For months,
however, the Soviet delegation ignored the evidence and declined to admit the existence of a

detection problem. When it finally agreed to a
technical conference, it refused to discuss the matter in scientific terms, resorting instead to political
exhortation and diatribe. Given the situation,
President Eisenhower on December 29, 1959, said
that the United States was no longer bound by its
self-imposed moratorium and considered itself free
to resume testing, but would not do so "without
announcing our intention in advance of any
resumption." '
However, even if all nuclear explosions could
not be detected, there was nonetheless no reason
why an agreement should not be reached banning
such tests as could be adequately monitored. In
March 1960, the Soviet Union agreed in principle
to the idea of a first-step treaty containing a
"threshold"-that is, a treaty which would ban all
aboveground tests and all underground tests above
the threshold of 4.75 magnitude. At the same
time, the United States and the United Kingdom
accepted the Soviet request for a moratorium on
underground tests below the threshold, and the
Soviet Union accepted the Anglo-American request
for a research program to work out effective in-

'The United States has not resumed testing.
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spection techniques for such tests. In May 1960,
Ambassador Tsarapkin declared, "The Soviet
Union has no objection if the U.S.S.R., the United
States and the United Kingdom carry out, during
the implementation of that programme, a strictly
limited number of joint underground nuclear explosions in order to verify the methods and instrumentation for controlling the cessation of
underground nuclear weapons tests below the
stated limit.'' Scientists from the three nations
met in Geneva and exchanged ideas on the design
of the research program.
But Soviet interest in improving seismic detection capabilities soon flagged. At the end of May
1960, Mr. Tsarapkin repudiated the view of his
own scientists that a research program was necessary. In the months since, the Soviet Union has
steadfastly declined to support seismic research.
In particular, the Soviet Union has done its best to
prevent research into the prevention of cheating,
especially through decoupling-though it seems
difficult to know how the Control Commission
could be expected to catch cheaters unless more is
learned about the whole cheating process. As
David Ormsby-Gore, the head of the British dele-

gation, put it, "The Soviet representative is
now
saying that, in certain cases, which are
scientifically proved and which have not been denied by the Soviet Union, there would be no control, and [yet] that no attempt would be made in
a research programme to achieve control."

...

Inspection and Control

The absence of effective seismic identification
makes inspection at the site of suspected nuclear
explosions all the more critical. Instruments in
the control posts can record and, within limits,
locate an earthshock, but they frequently cannot
identify it-that is, tell whether it was caused by
an earthquake or an explosion. In some cases, the
only way to find out may be by sending an inspection team to the site of the phenomenon.
The Geneva negotiators reached fairly quick
agreement on the necessity for a veto-free quota of
on-site inspections-that is, for a minimum yearly
number of inspection trips which a nation would
have to accept and could not veto. The British and
American representatives, arguing that the number
of inspections should be in reasonable proportion
to the number of suspicious phenomena, proposed

1

the "one out of five" principle-that only one out of
five earthshocks be inspected. This meant that if,
as the United States experts believe, over 100 large
unidentified earthshocks above 4.75 magnitude
occur every year in the Soviet Union, only 20 would
be inspected at the site. (The United States and
the United Kingdom offered the Soviet Union in
return 40 inspections in their own territories.)
The Soviet delegation, however, opposed the
notion that there should be any relationship between the number of inspections and the number
of suspicious phenomena. It insisted, moreover,
that the maximum number of on-site inspections
to be carried out each year in the nuclear nations
should be 3. "We simply propose this figure as a
political compromise," Mr. Tsarapkin frankly'said,
"without any relationship to the number of earthquakes occurring annually-whether it be a hundred thousand or a thousand, a hundred or tenwithout any relationship at all." The figure "3" is
thus admittedly meaningless; and the reduction of
on-site inspections to so small a number emasculates the whole enterprise of inspection. In practice, governments would tend to "store" their quota
until toward the end of the year lest a violator take

adGantage of the exhaustion of the quota in order
to conduct tests.
The Soviet Union has sought in other ways to
hedge round the inspection process. Thus, though
the Soviet propaganda position is nominally all in
favor of automatic and veto-free inspection within
the quota-inspection in response to signals on the
seismograph-its precise statements in this connection are most carefully restricted and restrictive.
The Soviet Union thus insists that a seismic event,
to be eligible for inspection, must be pinpointed
within an area of 200 square kilometers (about 75
square miles). Because underground events frequently cannot be located with such precision and
can practically never be so located with absolute
certainty, this stipulation would have the effect of
excluding a large proportion of (or possibly all)
unidentified phenomena from inspection. On top
of this, a seismic event, to be eligible for inspection,
must, in the words of Chairman Khrushchev,
repeated in the aide memoire of June 4, be
"suspected of being an atomic explosion." Mr.
Tsarapkin has similarly said, "The inspecting side
would have the right to carry out, within the limits
of an established quota, the inspection of any event

I
I

that was not an earthquake." The italicized
phrases suggest a possible joker : These phrases may
be used to prejudge the very issue which the inspection team is supposed to resolve. Even though
there are criteria for inspection on which objective
observers might agree, there is nothing to prevent
the Soviet member of the "troika" from refusing to
admit that the suspected event satisfies these criteria. In short, only events "suspected of being an
atomic explosion" and located within an impossibly
small area qualify, by the Soviet system, for vetofree inspection within the annual quota. If this is
not the case, the Soviet delegation has steadfastly
withstood all attempts at clarification.
The Soviet Union has resisted the installation
of an effective system of international control in
other ways. There has been argument about the
time when control should begin; the Soviet position is that there should be no on-site inspection
for 4 years after the treaty enters into force; Mr.
Tsarapkin has even spoken sarcastically about the
United States and the United Kingdom as being
"in a hurry to initiate inspection." There has
been argument about the number of control posts
to be established; the Soviet Union has consistently

favored fewer posts than necessary for effective
control. There has been argument about the staffing of control posts; the Soviet Union has insisted
that the chief of any control post in its own territory must be a Soviet citizen, that the chief of
any on-site inspection team operating within the
Soviet Union be a Soviet citizen, and that the team
itself consist 50 percent of Soviet citizens. The
effect of these Soviet proposals is to whittle international inspection down to self -inspection-w hich
means no effective inspection at all.
The professed Soviet reason for resistance to an
effective international inspection system is fear of
espionage. But the American and British representatives at Geneva repeatedly assured the Soviet
delegation that the government of an inspected
country could assign an army of secret police to
accompany the inspection team and watch its
every move so long as the observers did not interfere with the technical inspection process. Moreover, the inspection would take place within an
area predetermined by seismograph and limited
to 200 or 500 square kilometers. (The area of
the Soviet Union is 2 1,000,000 square kilometers;
if 20 inspections were made each year in different

parts of the Soviet Union, not more than one twothousandths of Soviet territory would be inspected.
In addition, most seismic events in the U.S.S.R.
are concentrated in remote and sparsely populated
spots making up a small percentage of the total
area of the Soviet Union. )
Any reasonable nation should be satisfied by
these treaty safeguards limiting the scope of inspection to its essential need. One is forced to conclude that the alleged Soviet fear of espionage is
no more than the conditioned reflex of a totalitarian state. The Soviet Government must recognize the test-ban treaty for what it is: a rational
means-from which it has nothing to fear-of
reducing the likelihood of nuclear war. I t must
realize that the inherent dynamism of modern
weapons technology, if uncontrolled, could eventually lead to the destruction of Soviet society as well
as that of the rest of the world.
Anticlimax in 1961

In spite of these persisting disagreements on
questions of underground testing and of inspection,
so much progress had been made in narrowing differences that the people of the world looked ahead

with eager confidence to the resumption of negotiations in Geneva in 1961. President Kennedy had
declared during his Presidential campaign his
determination to secure an "effective international
agreement banning all tests"; and the result of his
review of the American policy position was the
development of the series of new proposals, designed to break the negotiating deadlock.
These proposals, submitted by Ambassador
Arthur H. Dean on March 2 1, were as follows :
1. To reduce the number of on-site inspections
in each of the nuclear countries to a possible
12, depending on the number of suspicious
seismic events;
2. To reduce the number of control posts on
Soviet territory from 2 1 to 19;
3. To extend from 27 months to 3 years the
proposed moratorium on smaller underground tests and the associated research
program ;
4. To institute means for a ban on all nuclear
weapon tests at high altitudes and in outer
space ;
5. To ask Congress for legislative authority to
permit Soviet inspection of the internal

mechanism of the nuclear devices used in the
seismic research and peaceful uses programs;
6. To accept the Soviet request for a veto over
the annual budget of the control organization ;
7. To accept the Soviet demand for a parity of
seats between Western and Soviet bloc states
on the top Control Commission-an arrangement which would give the Soviet Union a
voice in guiding the control system equal to
that of the United States and the United
Kingdom combined, and which would be unprecedented in an international organization.
Instead of welcoming this attempt to resolve
outstanding differences, the Soviet Union responded with retraction of earlier agreements and
a root-and-branch assault on long-accepted principles of international organization. In particular, it advanced the doctrine of the "troika9'-the
proposal that the single administrator of the control organization be replaced by a tripartite board,
representing the Soviet Union, the allied democracies, and the neutrals, and required to act in
unanimity.

The "troika" proposal meant, of course, that
each nuclear power would have a veto over every
administrative act of the control organization except for the somewhat illusory rights of inspection
within the annual quota. In advancing this proposal against the idea of an impartial administrator, Soviet policy underwent a startling reversal.
On January 14, 1960, Mr. Tsarapkin had assured
the other delegates, "Out of the three thousand
million human beings on earth we shall always be
able to find someone on whom you and we can
agree." Again, in February, Mr. Tsarapkin said,
"In neutral countries it will always be possible to
find a person, a really neutral person, who can be
used for the job of carrying out the duties of administrator." In June he said, "It will always be possible to discover in the world a person acceptable
to both sides for nomination for the post as administrator." Now Mr. Tsarapkin says, "It is impossible to find a completely impartial neutral person."
In the words of the Soviet aide memoire,
while there are neutral states there are no--nor
can there be-neutral men."
While no man perhaps can be completely neutral in his innermost thoughts, many men have dis-

". . .

ciplined their innermost thoughts to make possible
the equitable adjudication of particular cases; it is
this neutrality in deed which underlies systems of
justice everywhere in the world, including the Soviet Union, which underlies the whole philosophy
and practice of science, and which equally underlies the effectiveness of international organization.
Dedicated men in the United Nations and other
international bodies are demonstrating every day
that loyalty to their own states does not interfere
with loyalty to a community of nations.
Nor can it be asserted that the "troika" is necessary to protect the Soviet Union against the wayward independence of the single administrator.
Under provisions of the treaty already accepted by
all sides, the administrator is made accountable to
the policymaking Control Commission and can
work only under its continuous supervision. His
appointment and the appointment of his first deputy are subject to Soviet veto. The Soviet Union
has the right to nominate two additional deputy
administrators. The staff of the control organization is to include equal representation from the two
nuclear sides. Decisions as to the total amount of

the annual budget, and as to amendment of the
treaty, are subject to Soviet veto.
Is the Soviet Union disturbed by fears that a
single administrator might corrupt the control system? Or does its attitude really spring from a
profound distaste for effective control at all?
Chairman Khrushchev said with brutal frankness
on July 10, 1961, "Even if all the countries of the
world adopted a decision that did not accord with
the interests of the Soviet Union and threatened its
security, the Soviet Union would not recognize such
a decision but would uphold its rights, relying on
force."
Can the World Ever Stop Nuclear Tests?

Denis Healey of the British Labour Party recently
said of the test-ban negotiations, "If Nikita Khrushchev had deliberately aimed to undermine the
position of those who believe that Russia recognizes
a common interest with America in ending the arms
race and stopping the spread of atomic weapons, he
could scarcely have succeeded more completely."
In an effort to disguise its opposition to a test-ban
treaty, the Soviet Union, repudiating its own longheld position that the test ban is a separate issue,

now proposes that test-ban negotiations be merged
with general disarmament talks. In 1959, the
Soviet Government said that it "has proceeded and
still proceeds from the premise that the question of
ending tests can be solved straightaway independently of the solution of the other problems of disarmament, given the desire of all the nuclear
powers." Its present shift of position is transparently a cynical effort to wave away the test-ban
problem. For, if the nuclear powers cannot agree
on the relatively manageable problem of the test
ban, they can hardly hope for agreement on the
far more intricate problems of general disarmament.
Merging the test-ban negotiations with the comprehensive disarmament negotiations is essentially
a Soviet effort to perpetuate a situation in which
the United States and the United Kingdom accept
an uninspected moratorium on testing. For the
United States, such a moratorium would be, in fact,
inspected, not only by the will of the Government
but by the relentlessly vigilant public opinion of an
open society. If ever the United States were disposed to test clandestinely, it could neither conceal
this course from the American people or the world

nor justify it to them. But the Soviet Union, with
its closed society, its Government unaccountable to
parliament or press or public opinion, its actions
shrouded in a veil of secrecy, can, if it wishes, conduct nuclear tests without serious fear of exposure.
Without a treaty-backed inspection system, it is
simply impossible to tell whether secret nuclear
testing is going on in closed societies.
The danger is that secret testing may produce
a technological breakthrough in nuclear weapons
development, giving the testing nations a decisive
advantage. For almost 3 years, the United States
has been willing to assume the risk of not testing
nuclear weapons without the certainty that the
Soviet Union has likewise stopped its testing. No
nation determined to protect the freedom of its
people can accept this risk indefinitely.
The Soviet attitude would seem to raise a fundamental qu~stion: For the U.S.S.R., is the nuclear
test ban only a pretext for propaganda and not a
road to peace?
But the people of the world have not given up
their hope for universal disarmament. They have
not given up their hope for the control of nuclear

weapons or for the elimination of nuclear testing.
They insist on a continuing struggle to abolish war.
The outcome of great issues depends on the
cumulative effects of individual actions. Every
person has a duty to inform himself of the deep
significance of the test-ban treaty for disarmament
and peace. And every person can help others to
learn, which will often mean action through larger
organizations-schools, newspapers, political parties, voluntary associations of many kinds. Then
both persons and organizations should do all within
their power to make their governments hear and
feel and understand the issues. Action by governments is especially important in the United Nations, the forum of aspirations for all the world's
peoples.
The test-ban treaty is a first essential step toward
disarmament and the abolition of war. To reject
the Geneva treaty would accelerate the arms race.
It would invite the resumption of nuclear tests.
Chairman Khrushchev said on June 21 of this year,
"Quite a few devices requiring practical testing
have been developed in the Soviet Unionyy-a
yearning which he alone, among the leaders of the
great powers has expressed. Rejection of the
treaty would require the other nuclear powers to

consider whatever steps may be necessary in their
own self-defense. It would encourage the development of new weapons and the spread of nuclear
weapons to additional nations. If any nation resumed fallout tests-tests in the earth's atmosphere-it would increase the genetic and biological hazards of radioactive contamination. It
would defer mankind's great hope that international institutions might in time banish the curse
of war.
The test-ban treaty has become the symbol of
man's hope for a peaceful world. The United
States and the United Kingdom are fully prepared
to welcome within their borders all the international control operations necessary to insure an
effective ban on nuclear testing. They ask the
Soviet Union to accept no more in the way of control than they accept for themselves. If it rejects
the test-ban treaty, the Soviet Union will take on
itself an awful burden of responsibility for the
future of mankind.
The people of the world must pray that the final
effort on the part of the United States and the
United Kingdom to conclude a test-ban treaty will
be rewarded with success. For the sake of humanity, the Soviet Union must reconsider its stand.

